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VII. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Court has maintained a steady and progressive
pace in the area of products liability. A reading of the court's decisions in
this area shows that the court is concerned with the policies set forth in
both Seely and Santor justifying strict liability for defective products. The
court's existing decisions relied upon by the appellate courts and the federal district court to allow recovery for direct economic harm seem correctly decided, since direct economic harm is really nothing less than property damages. However, the extension of this holding to the area of consequential damages in the commercial setting by the lower courts should
be restrained. Although recovery of these damages in the consumer area
gives substance to one of the policies behind strict liability, recovery in the
commercial area undermines the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.
EDWARD

J.

HOWLETT

II

RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT OF PERSONS ACQUITTED
BY REASON OF INSANITY IN OHIO*
I.

A

N OHIO JURY

INTRODUCTION

verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity presumes that

such insanity continues.' Upon an affirmative finding, the trial judge
shall commit the defendant to Lima state hospital.2 According to statute, the
defendant must remain hospitalized until "restored to reason."3
This phrase was interpreted by the Ohio Court of Appeals, Allen
County, in Wolonsky v. Balson.4 The defendant was actively psychotic at
the time of his commitment. By reason of the administration of psychotropic drugs he attained a state of complete remission from the symptoms
of his psychosis and sought release from his commitment in a habeas corpus
action. Among the questions at issue concerning insanity defense law' were
*While this Comment was at the press, the Ohio General Assembly passed Senate Bill 297
(sponsored by Senator Morris Jackson) which became effective April 30, 1980. Among
other things, this law strengthens the control of the trial judge over a person who has
been acquitted by reason of insanity. It also relieves the probate court of commitment and
release authority in these situations. See S.B., 297, 113th Ohio Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1980).
'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1975).
2 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (Page 1975).
3

id.
' 387 N.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. Ohio 1976).
5 Throughout the note, "insanity" will denote the degree of mental illness that exculpates
a defendant in a criminal trial. "Insanity defense" will denote the invocation of mental illness
as a defense to criminal liability. "Release" will denote release from a mental hospital or
institution. "Acquitted patient" will denote any person who has successfully invoked the
insanity defense and then has been hospitalized.
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two involving release of acquitted patients: 1) the definition of "restored
to reason" as a practical release standard; and 2) the proper authority for
effecting release.
The court in its per curiam opinion held that:
[W]here a person committed under section 2945.39 has acquired the
capacity either to know the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law only by reason of a course of
medication and will lose such capacity should such course of medication not be continued such person's potential of becoming actively
psychotic is substantially greater than the average human being and
he has not been restored to sanity and is not sane in the sense required
by either section 2945.39 or by In re Remus, 119 Ohio St. 166, 162
N.E. 740 (1928) for release pursuant to a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.'
The Court also held that the committing court, "... a tribunal composed
of the judge of the court of common pleas of Allen county, the superintendent of the Lima state hospital, an alienist to be designated by said
judge and superintendent, or a majority of them,"7 can make the "restored
to reason" determination and order release. This note focuses on the relationship between acquittal and release standards.
II. BACKGROUND

Insanity as a Defense - The M'Naghten Rule
In England the legal standard and formula for acquittal by reason
of insanity remained uncertain for centuries. 8 At the beginning of the nineteenth century modem theories of exculpation began to emerge.' In 1843,
the now famous M'Naghten rule was proclaimed:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must clearly be
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
A.

wrong10

The rule focuses on the ultimate behavioral product that is produced by
mental illness and its effects on reason; hospitalization or institutionalization
may be required for the person who was engaged in conduct not socially
or morally condoned.

6 387
7

N.E.2d at 627.

Id.

8HoLDswORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 315-16, 172 (1923).
9 STEARNs, EUROPEAN SOCIETY IN UPHEAVAL: SOCIAL HIsToRY SINcE 1800 1-54 (1967)

(gen-

eral historical background).
"I M'Naghten Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). The rule derives from Lord Chief

Justice Tindal's answer to a question.
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Ohio's version of the M'Naghten rule is virtually identical with the old
English test. While doing the act, the accused's mind must have been so
afflicted with disease as to render him incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong as to the particular act done and as of the time when
the act was done. 1 Accordingly, it had been said by the court (Farrer v.
State12) that:
The power of self-control - "free agency" - is said to be quite as essential to criminal accountability as the power to distinguish between
right and wrong. And I have no doubt that every correct definition of
sanity, either expressly or by necessary construction, must suppose
freedom of will, to avoid a wrong, no less than the power to distinguish
between the wrong and the right."
B.

Hospitalization, Institutionalizationand Treatment
A sovereign authority may hospitalize all mentally ill persons within
its jurisdiction."' Commitment, which is achieved through a variety of procedures, can generally be grouped into five categories. The first two are
within the criminal procedure system: commitment upon acquittal by reason
of insanity, 5 the focus of this note; and commitment upon a determination
of incompetence to stand trial.' The three remaining types of procedures
are within the civil commitment system and require no evil act for invocation:
voluntary application for hospitalization; court ordered commitment, without
medical opinion, compelled by an emergency situation; and involuntary
commitment after a hearing at which medical or psychiatric testimony is
presented.'
Authority to commit is justified on the basis of the state's police and
parens patriae powers.18 These powers relate to the state's responsibility to
protect society from the mentally ill and the mentally ill from themselves.
The state's dual responsibility is reflected in the purposes of hospitalization:
the security of society and the treatment of the individual. 9 Thus, commitment may be viewed as a balance between the interests of society and the
individual.
"The rule was first enunciated in Ohio in Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598 (1857).
122 Ohio St. 54 (1853).
13Id. at 70.

14 Broderick, Justice in the Books or Justice in Action - An Institutional Approach to In-

voluntary Hospitalization for Mental Illness, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 547 (1971).

15 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page 1975).

6 Ormo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (Page 1975).

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122 et. seq. (Page 1975).
18 Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA.
'7

L. REv. 75 (1968); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Processes, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1288, 1289-97 (1966); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's
Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. REv. 293 (1966).
'9

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (Page Supp. 1978).
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It is inevitable that conflict between the requirements of security and
therapy will erupt. Treatment is directed toward rehabilitation; yet the
mental hospital serves as a prison separating the mentally ill from society."
The conflict is most acute where acquitted patients are concerned, since
they are subject to commitment and release through the criminal process.

Psychiatric consensus is that a security orientation is important to treatment
programs.2 However, the place of confinement is usually a mental hospital
and most often, a maximum security unit within it.22 While it is unquestionable that security wards are necessary for certain types of patients, a security
orientation may be anti-therapeutic. 3 This orientation continues to exist
because society's security interest outweighs the patient's individual treat-

ment interest.
The staff in a criminal ward of a hospital or a psychiatric ward of
a prison is faced with the problem of devising a program that will treat and
care, and at the same time keep the inmates securely locked up. As already
stated, there is no way of reconciling these two functions. The therapeutic
ideal calls for allowing patients more and more responsibility for their own
actions with correlative diminishing restrictions and controls, which inevitably means accepting greater or lesser security risks.2" Any type of in-5
stitutionalization, even in the best of hospitals, militates against therapy.1
A closer family environment would be the best treatment.2 6 Maximum security
in practice means close confinement in a cell, and there is little in the nature
of a treatment program that can be conducted under such conditions.
Faced with this irreconcilable conflict, the administration has only a
choice of emphasis. It can place overwhelming stress on security, and in
effect abandon almost all efforts at therapy, or it can take a certain degree
of risk, and provide some broader therapeutic program. Wise compromises
are required, but however wisely the balance is struck, it remains a compromise. Some sacrifice of one of the competing social interests is inevitable.2 7
The security and therapy conflict intensifies where a right to treatment
exists for mental patients. The parens patriae authority of the state recog20 Magleby, Should the Criminally Insane Be Housed in Prisons? 47 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 677

(1957).
Greenwald, Disposition of the Insane Defendant After "Acquittal" - The Long Road from
Commitment to Release, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 583, 586 (1968); Weihofen, Institutional
Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REv. 849, 853 (1960).
22
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 143-44 (1967).
23 B. Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic Psychiatry, 45 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 123, 132
21

(1954); Magleby, Should the Criminally Insane be Housed in Prisons?47 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
677, 680 (1957).
24
Clausen & Yarrow, Paths to the Mental Hospital, 11 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 25 (1955).
25 Goffman,

On the Characteristicsof Total Institutions, Proceedings of the Symposium on

Preventive and Social Psychiatry, WALTER REE-) ARMY
2aTAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 4 (1951).
2

7 Id.
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nizes that society can and should provide the means by which a patient can
obtain release. 8 Ohio guarantees a statutory right to treatment. 9 The guaranteed treatment, however, is directed at a release standard that includes
some judgment about the mentally ill person's potential for dangerousness."
Effective implementation of the right to treatment should focus on the
effects of hospitalization on the patient's release potential. Release can be
difficult if a hospital's security orientation is anti-therapeutic for the patient.
A better accommodation must be reached between society's security interest and the individual's right to treatment.
C.

Release
There are two general institutional methods for releasing acquitted
patients." A hospital superintendent or some other administrative authority
may be authorized to order a patient's release." Ohio, and a majority of
states, authorize the committing court to order release. 3' This evidences
the need felt by state legislatures for keeping a judicial rein on psychiatric
decisions and places emphasis on state police power.
A court determination of release is basically an allocation of social
risk, while a psychiatric release is essentially a judgment within a rehabilitative framework. The judge decides whether or not the patient is potentially
dangerous to society while the psychiatrist decides whether the patient's
progress warrants release or will be furthered by his leaving the hospital.
A judge, of course, might consider the therapeutic value of a release, and
a psychiatrist probably does consider possible social repercussions. '
III. OHIO RELEASE ANALYZED: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING?
A. Release Authority
Under the Ohio statute dealing with disposition of persons acquitted
by reason of insanity," "such fact shall be found by the jury in its verdict,
28

See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law & Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV.

945 (1959); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,79 HARV.
L. REV. 1288 (1966); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evalu-

ated, 51 MINN. L. REV. 293 (1966).
29 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (Page 1975).
30 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1975).
31 Habeas Corpus, available for all who are illegally deprived of their liberty, is another
method by which a patient may obtain his freedom. Ohio guarantees the right to seek habeas

corpus for mental patients by statute. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1975).
Id.

32

33 Id.; See Note, Procedure for the Commitment and Release of the Criminally Insane, 4
WMILAMETrE L.J. 64 (1966).

34 Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Hayward v. Overholser, 191 F.
Supp. 464 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overholser, v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
GUTrMACHER, A REVIEW OF CASES SEEN BY A COURT PSYCHIATRIST, IN THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS

35

OHIo REV. CODE

ANN.

OF THE MENTALLY ILL

§ 2945.39 (Page 1975).
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and it is presumed that such insanity continues.""4 The statute provides that
the situs of responsibility to release acquitted, committed defendants shall
reside in the judge, the hospital superintendent, a designated alienist or a
majority of them. 7 This codification of legislative intent indicates that the
Ohio legislature intended release power to be shared by judicial and institutional authorities.
Institutional release for patients who have been acquitted in criminal
proceedings requires notice, a hearing and a court order in Ohio."8 Release
without a court order is available for most civilly committed patients. 9
The distinction between civil and criminally acquitted patients is not
founded on psychiatric theory or practice. When psychiatrists examine acquitted patients in terms of the danger they pose to society, the hospital and
themselves, they are really trying to predict probable future behavior. 0 The
illegal act and the individual's personal history become important factors1
4
for psychiatric consideration. If, as in the case of Lynch v. Overholser,
the individual's illegal conduct involved forging checks, psychiatric opinion
would likely require less stringent hospital security measures than would
be required against a person who committed homicide.
The statutory distinction between civilly committed and criminally acquitted patients implies a difference involving social and legal considerations. Presently, release standards stress dangerousness. However, a test
stressing illegality rather than dangerousness would treat two criminally acquitted patients in the same manner; and both would be treated differently
than patients civilly committed.
Release in this context becomes a social rather than a medical judgment. A psychiatrist might consider the possibility of continued check
forging insufficient "danger" to warrant continued hospitalization; a court
would view that same behavior within the context of illegality. The situs of
release authority, therefore, reflects an allocation of social risk, and the
Wolonsky court, in placing that authority with the courts, determined that
the courts are best able to allocate that risk. However, an alternative is
available, since it seems that the mere existence of an actus reus need not
require a different disposition for acquitted patients than for patients civilly
committed.4 2 At the time of release, the patient's initial conduct requiring
3

Id.

7

38 Id.
Id.
1'
§ 5122.03 (Page 1975).

9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
40

JOHNSON,

RELEASING THE DANGEROUS

OFFENDER,

IN THE CLINICAL EVALUATION

OF THE

DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Rappeport ed. 1967).

F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
This analysis distinguishes between three different types of mental patients: 1) civil patients,

41288
42

2) acquitted patients whose conduct has not been violently dangerous, and 3) acquitted
patients whose conduct has been violently dangerous. Initial hospitalization may require

different degrees of security depending which category the patient falls into. However, this
original classification should not be controlling at the time a release determination is made.
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hospitalization should be only one of many factors affecting a prediction
of his dangerousness potential. Hence, any proposal for a new release system
should reevaluate the distinction made between civil and criminally acquitted
patients for purposes of release.
"Restored to Reason"
The Wolonsky court refused to distinguish between the M'Naghten
standard for acquittal and the "restored to reason" standard for release. The
court found that Balson's psychotic break, without inquiry into the episode's
etiology, sufficed under the M'Naghten test to establish insanity and to acquit
a defendant. "3 Such a break with reality may suffice to acquit a defendant.
However, under the "restored to reason" standard, it is inadequate to determine when an acquitted patient qualifies for release. To decide whether
a patient is "restored to reason," it is not possible to view the psychotic explosion in isolation from the underlying illness."
B.

Thus, inquiry into the underlying illness was, at the time of Wolonsky,
necessary for release in Ohio, while it was not necessary for acquittal. This
appears to leave the M'Naghten and "restored to reason" standards inconsistent. According to the Wolonsky court, it was the legislature's view that
legal sanity resulted from a defect of reason. 5 Therefore, the court found that
the legislature intended no release for acquitted patients until the threat
of the defect is eliminated. The M'Naghten test, however, might not require
the elimination of the underlying illness. The release standard could require
remission," the abatement of a patient's symptoms, since a patient in remission might well understand the nature and quality of his acts and the
difference between right and wrong. The Wolonsky court, however, specifically refused to direct release for a patient whose remission depended on
a continued course of medication, since his underlying illness "remains
existing."" This determination can be harmonized with the M'Naghten
test by recognizing that the underlying illness is a precondition for the
M'Naghten defect of reason. Under this analysis to eliminate the defect
the underlying illness would also have to be eliminated.
Even without expressly considering M'Naghten, the Wolonsky court
reached the same result since it framed the issue of release as a function of
social harm. The court determined that acquittal should not impose
upon society the risk of persons whose behavior might again become ir43 Wolonsky v. Balson, 387 N.E.2d at 625.
4"

,5

See JOHNSON, supra note 40.
387 N.E.2d at 625.

PsYcHIATRIc DicTIoNARY 641 (3rd ed. 1960);
[A]batement may be partial or complete. Physicians use the expression remission to
denote an amelioration, which even if complete for the time being, does not necessarily
imply cure; in fact, the term carries the idea that the amelioration of the symptoms is
temporary.
,7 387 N.E.2d at 625.

46 HINsIE & CAMPBELL,
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rationally dangerous. The court, in effect, required a social guarantee; it
held that a defendant's "original state of sanity is not restored until the
subject's potential for becoming actively psychotic is not substantially greater
than that of the average human being."48
The court's analysis forces a psychiatric determination of the etiology
of the patient's psychosis. 9 The psychiatrist must identify the condition that
caused the psychotic behavior. The goal of most psychiatric therapies,
however, is to alter deviant behavior, not to remove the underlying illness
or condition."
Psychoanalysis is the therapy aimed most specifically at the identification and subsequent neutralization of psychoses. 1 Psychoanalysis is a lengthy
and expensive process,5 2 however, which is not usually available in public
hospitals." Consequently, the probability of an individual satisfying the "restored to reason" release standard seems low.
Effective neutralization of the underlying illness appears to be an
alternative to the "restored to reason" standard. The threat of social harm
from the defect of reason, however, must still be eliminated. Since remission
48 Id.

Etiology is the investigation or assignment of causes to a disease. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERDICTIONARY 878 (2d ed. 1955). Psychosis is any serious mental derangement. Id.
at 2002.
50 FREEDMAN & KAPLAN, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1196-97 (1967).
51 Id. at 1189. Psychiatrists distinguish among three general types of therapies; psychological,
organic and milius. Id. at 1189-90. Psychological therapies include psychoanalysis, behavior
therapy and group psychotherapy. Id. at 1196-1234. The behavior therapies are a recent development. They are based on the theory that any response to any stimulus may be modified. Id. at
1217-28. Obviously, to modify responses, the stimuli's effects on the basic personality must
be isolated. However, the therapy envisions isolating "incompatible" stimuli and responses.
This resembles a channeling process. By isolating the stimulus, psychiatrists can manipulate
response-behavior. Id. It is doubtful that this therapy will remove the underlying condition
of which the court wrote. The therapy may neutralize it. However, two considerations make
that doubtful. First, behavior therapy is relatively new; second, conditioning may not be
strong enough to provide lasting results. Behavior therapies are currently in use in several
49

NATIONAL

public institutions, prisons and hospitals. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to
"Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
616, 617-20 (1972). Group psychotherapy is the popular "encounter group." FREEDMAN &
KAPLAN, supra note 50, at 1234.

Organic therapies include the administration of drugs, electric shock therapy and psychosurgery. id. at 1252-96. These therapies are especially successful where an organic disorder,
such as a brain tumor, is the cause of the patient's mental illness. Lobotomy clearly removes
an underlying condition. However, it is more a surgical procedure than a psychiatric therapy.
Id. See generally Rose, Criminal Responsibility and Competency as Influenced by Organic
Disease, 35 Mo. L. REv. 326, 330-35 (1970). Although not completely understood, electric
shock therapy often produces excellent results in the treatment of schizophrenia. The therapy
takes only a few weeks. FREEDMAN & KAPLAN, supra note 50, at 1279-82. Either psychosurgery or electric shock might "restore to reason" an acquitted patient. However, psychosurgery is a rather drastic step (especially lobotomy), and electric shock does not always
produce lasting effects. Id. at 1252-96.
52Id. at 1197.
53
STRAUSS, SHATZMAN, BUCHER, EHRLICH & SABSHIN, PSYCHIATRIC IDEOLOGIES AND INSTITUTIONS 137-38 (1964).
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was rejected by the Wolonsky court as not meeting the "restored to reason"
test, neutralization must involve additional psychiatric safeguards.
Spontaneous remission, the cause and duration of which is unknown,
cannot provide the basis for a medical guarantee of continued nondangerous
behavior." Remission induced by some form of medical therapy, on the
other hand, could continue with sufficient medical assurance as long as the
therapeutic program was maintained." If conditional release, which existed in Ohio at the time of Wolonsky,58 were made available to Balson,
then a post-hospitalization therapy program could have qualified an acquitted patient for release by neutralizing his potential for social harm. The
release standard would focus on the patient's dangerousness to others and
would recognize "the fairly recent impact on the field of mental illness of the
use of psychotropic drugs."5
IV.

TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY RELEASE MODEL

Any release system should provide security for society and eventual
liberty for those involved. Adoption of a system favoring one or the other
goal betrays an implicit bias in favor of societal protection or individual
liberty, since the goals are not mutually exclusive. It is submitted that both
aims are of equal importance. Since Wolonsky, the Ohio legislature has
enacted new statutes. 9 The new state code fails to eliminate many of the
problems in release advanced herein.
A primary question is where release authority should be placed. The
new statutes retain primary authority in the judiciary."0 However, as long
as society's security interest in release is satisfied, there seems no valid reason for courts to pass on every acquitted patient's release. The new statute6 1
gives the head of the hospital or managing officer the authority to initiate
release proceedings. The state then has five days to challenge the release
by requesting a full hearing."2 Patients will automatically be discharged if
54 Beiser, The Lame Princess: A Study of the Remission of Psychiatric Symptoms Without
Treatment, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 257 (1972); Beiser, A Psychiatric Follow-up Study of
"Normal" Adults, 127 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 1464 (1971).
55Conditional release is essential to the psychiatric therapeutic model. See FREEMAN & SIMMONS, THE MENTAL PATIENT COMES HOME 201 (1963); SILVERSTEIN, PSYCmATRIC
cARE (1968); CHANGING PATTERNS IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE (Rothman ed. 1969).
56 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1975)

AFrmE-

[This section provides that when a person committed to Lima State Hospital is released pursuant to a habeas corpus proceeding, his release may be with certain condi-

tions attached. Under former law, only unconditional release was possible. Id., Committee Comment at 283.
57 387 N.E.2d at 627.
58 This avoids a value judgment upon the relative merits of hospitalization goals. Although
analysis of the insanity defense is possible by a criminal law goal model, this note does not
suggest that rehabilitation and incapacitation are clear goals. Retribution is illogical, for

there has been no crime. Deterrence may be part of rehabilitation.

5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.39 and 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1978).
60 Id.

01 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Pago Supp. 1978).
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no request is made by the court. To ensure a smoothly run administrative
release process within the hospital, the statute mandates periodic review
of patients' cases. 3
Beyond finding the proper institutional authority to release, an acceptable release standard must be established. The new statute uses a
4
standard of dangerousness to self and others." As compared with the Wolonsky standard, the new statute is more consistent with the capabilities of a
release authority, since it is one with which psychiatrists can make more
effective evaluations. It is more easily translated into the psychiatric model
which bases patient release on patient behavior. It is compatible with the
hospital release authority and the goal of providing an individual with
the opportunity for release. Although a standard of dangerousness to self
and others balances an individual's interest in rehabilitation with society's
interest in security, a better balancing would result if the standard were
5
restricted to dangerousness to others. To include dangerousness to self
in a test seems incompatible with the suggested premise of individual liberty
through rehabilitation. It seems, moreover, to be an unnecessary imposition
of the state's parens patriae power over the individual.
Another question raised and answered by the court in Wolonsky was
whether a patient qualifies for release under the "restored to reason" test if
his improved mental state is dependent upon the continued use of medication. The court emphatically stated that the individual has not been "restored to reason" within the meaning contemplated by section 2945.39.6
The court did:
[C]ommend to the legislature its consideration of the fairly recent impact
on the field of mental illness of the use of psychotropic drugs. The
effective use of such drugs did not exist at the time of the adoption
of section 2945.39 in basic concept. Such impact should be provided
for, but is not a subject of action permitted to this court."
The legislation passed in 1978, however, did not embody the court's recommendation. Thus, the impact of psychotropic drugs on mental illness remains
unrecognized by Ohio's legal profession and unincorporated in the state's
release standard.
The best accommodation of the interests of society and the individual
that should be considered for the future, would be a release standard of
63 Id. See S.B. 297, 113th Ohio Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1980)

for revisions in this procedure.

(Page Supp. 1978).
65 See, Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousnessand Mental illness, Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 230-36 (1960);
Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
64

OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B)

Dir. 1969).

*6 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1975).
67 387 N.E.2d at 627.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss3/9

10

592

AKRON LAw RmE W

[Vol. 13:3

Hess: Aquitted by Reason of Insanity

dangerousness to others which is administered by hospital authorities subject to court review. This model would allow psychiatrists to determine the
release potential of individual patients with a minimum of initial legal interference. Finally, the interests of both the legal and psychiatric professions
would be respected by the establishment of a standard in which one profession's concern would be accommodated by the other.
CARYL
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